Sedov Alexei
Sedov Alexei - Buscar Personas en bases de datos con información pública del Registro Nacional ALEXEI SEDOV
| Nombre : | ALEXEI SEDOV | | Alias : | Aleksei Sedov; Aleksei Semyonovich SEDOV; Aleksei Semyonovich Sedov; Aleksey Semjonovitsj Sedov; Alexei Sedov; Alexei Semenovich Sedov; Alexey Sedov; SEDOV, Aleksei; SEDOV, Aleksei Semyonovich; SEDOV, Alexei; SEDOV, Alexei Semenovich; Sedov Aleksei Semyonovich; Sedov Alexei; Sedov Alexey Semenovich; Siedov Oleksii Semenovych; Алексей Седов; Алексей Семенович Седов; Алексей Семёнович Седов; Седов Алексей Семенович; Седов Алексей Семёнович; Седов Олексій Семенович; Седов, Алексей; Седов, Алексей Семенович; Седов, Алексей Семёнович; Сєдов Олексій Семенович | | Fecha de nacimiento : | 1954-08-26 | | País : | ru;suhh | | Dirección : | Russia | | Persona con Información Pública : | Id Q4412919 | | Sanciones : | 497/2021 - active - 2021-10-05;NPWMD - Executive Order 13382 (Non-proliferation);Reciprocal - 2021-08-20;Russia / Russie - 1, Part 1.1;"The Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 - Alexei Sedov is the Head of the '2nd Service' Unit in the Federal Security of the Russian Federation (FSB). There is reasonable grounds to suspect that the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation was involved in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny using a toxic nerve agent. As Head of the '2nd Service' Unit, Sedov is responsible for, engaged in, provided support for, or promoted the activities conducted by this unit in the FSB. Alternatively, he is associated with those who did. This designation is part of a further package of designations targeting the FSB operatives directly involved in carrying out the operation. Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny was the victim of an attempted assassination during his August 2020 visit to Siberia, in which a chemical weapon - a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group - was used. The activities and movements of Alexey Navalny during his journey to Siberia, from where he intended to return to Moscow on 20th August 2020, were closely monitored by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny is a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. - Alexei Sedov is the Head of the ""2nd Service"" Unit in the Federal Security of the Russian Federation (FSB). There is reasonable grounds to suspect that the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation was involved in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny using a toxic nerve agent. As Head of the ""2nd Service"" Unit, Sedov is responsible for, engaged in, provided support for, or promoted the activities conducted by this unit in the FSB. Alternatively, he is associated with those who did. This designation is part of a further package of designations targeting the FSB operatives directly involved in carrying out the operation.
Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny was the victim of an attempted assassination during his August 2020 visit to Siberia, in which a chemical weapon - a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group - was used. The activities and movements of Alexey Navalny during his journey to Siberia, from where he intended to return to Moscow on 20th August 2020, were closely monitored by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation.
Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group).
Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents.
Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny is a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. - 2021-08-20" | | Fuente : | ACF List of War Enablers;Canadian Consolidated Autonomous Sanctions List;Taiwan Strategic High-Tech Commodities Entity List;UK FCDO Sanctions List;US OFAC Press Releases;US OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List;US SAM Procurement Exclusions;US Trade Consolidated Screening List (CSL);Ukraine NSDC State Register of Sanctions;Wikidata;Wikidata Entities of Interest | | Fecha : | 2026-03-16T11:28:59 |
ALEXEI SEDOV
| Detalle : | ALEXEI SEDOV | | Tipo : | Person | | Nombre Completo : | SEDOV, Aleksei Semyonovich; Сєдов Олексій Семенович; Алексей Семенович Седов; Sedov Alexei; Aleksei Semyonovich Sedov; Alexei Semenovich Sedov; Aleksei Semyonovich SEDOV; Алексей Семёнович Седов; Седов Олексій Семенович; Sedov Alexey Semenovich; Aleksei Sedov; Седов Алексей Семенович; Alexey Sedov; Aleksey Semjonovitsj Sedov; ALEXEI SEDOV | | Alias : | Седов, Алексей Семёнович; Седов Алексей Семёнович; SEDOV, Aleksei; SEDOV, Alexei Semenovich; Алексей Семенович Седов; Седов, Алексей Семенович; Седов Алексей Семенович; Siedov Oleksii Semenovych; Alexei Sedov; Alexei Semenovich Sedov; Алексей Седов; Алексей Семёнович Седов; Седов, Алексей; Aleksei Sedov; SEDOV, Alexei; Sedov Aleksei Semyonovich | | Nombre : | ALEXEI SEMENOVICH; Aleksei Semyonovich; Alexei; Алексей; Aleksey; Aleksei | | Apellido : | SEDOV; Sedov; Седов | | Género : | male | | Fecha de nacimiento : | 1954-08-26 | | Lugar de Nacimiento : | Sochi, Russia; м. Сочі, РФ; Sochi | | Posición : | Head of FSB 2nd Service; керівник 2 служби ФСБ РФ (cлужба захисту конституційного ладу та боротьби з тероризмом) | | País : | ru | | Nacionalidad : | ru | | Notas : | Russisch Kolonel-generaal; The Director Disqualification Sanction was imposed on 09/04/2025.; (also ALEKSEI SEMYONOVICH SEDOV); Head of the Service for Defense of Constitutional Order and Fight against Terrorism of the FSB, which organized the attempted murder of Alexei Navalny with the use of chemical weapons.; (also ALEKSEI SEDOV, ALEXEI SEMENOVICH SEDOV, ALEXEI SEDOV) | | Dirección : | Russia | | Sanciones : | ca-sema-436870abefadb7c9b938e1f3651e4b4f765ee526; Russia / Russie; Sanction; ; ca_dfatd_sema_sanctions; 2024-08-06T09:43:02; 2026-03-27T12:43:02; 2025-05-19T18:43:02; Q4412919; https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/sanctions/consolidated-consolide.aspx?lang=eng; 2022-11-10; ca; https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/sanctions/legislation-lois.aspx?lang=eng; 1, Part 1.1; CA-SEMA; Russia / Russie; Global Affairs Canada; 31; ; gb-fcdo-92d9eb80aac59fe12e864a22f1ec56284b242c78; The Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019; Sanction; ; gb_fcdo_sanctions; 2024-05-09T21:39:15; 2026-03-27T12:40:02; 2026-01-08T10:35:40; 2025-04-09; Asset freeze; Travel Ban; Director Disqualification Sanction; 14138; CHW0024; Alexei Sedov is the Head of the '2nd Service' Unit in the Federal Security of the Russian Federation (FSB). There is reasonable grounds to suspect that the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation was involved in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny using a toxic nerve agent. As Head of the '2nd Service' Unit, Sedov is responsible for, engaged in, provided support for, or promoted the activities conducted by this unit in the FSB. Alternatively, he is associated with those who did. This designation is part of a further package of designations targeting the FSB operatives directly involved in carrying out the operation. Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny was the victim of an attempted assassination during his August 2020 visit to Siberia, in which a chemical weapon - a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group - was used. The activities and movements of Alexey Navalny during his journey to Siberia, from where he intended to return to Moscow on 20th August 2020, were closely monitored by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny is a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack.; Alexei Sedov is the Head of the "2nd Service" Unit in the Federal Security of the Russian Federation (FSB). There is reasonable grounds to suspect that the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation was involved in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny using a toxic nerve agent. As Head of the "2nd Service" Unit, Sedov is responsible for, engaged in, provided support for, or promoted the activities conducted by this unit in the FSB. Alternatively, he is associated with those who did. This designation is part of a further package of designations targeting the FSB operatives directly involved in carrying out the operation.
Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny was the victim of an attempted assassination during his August 2020 visit to Siberia, in which a chemical weapon - a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group - was used. The activities and movements of Alexey Navalny during his journey to Siberia, from where he intended to return to Moscow on 20th August 2020, were closely monitored by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation.
Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group).
Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents.
Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny is a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack.; The Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019; gb; https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-uk-sanctions-list; GB-CW; UK; Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office; https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/uk-chemical-weapons-sanctions; 2021-08-20; Q4412919; ; ofac-058c25efd52c872fe33c6714ea562f7875f20eba; NPWMD; Sanction; ; us_ofac_sdn; 2023-04-20T10:27:20; 2026-03-27T12:30:54; 2025-06-02T12:10:03; 32735; us; NPWMD; Block; https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Pages/default.aspx; Q4412919; https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/non-proliferation-sanctions; Executive Order 13382 (Non-proliferation); US-NON-PROLIF; NPWMD; Office of Foreign Assets Control; ; ua-nsdc-8c98c71961b49a33a91a0c5b3ed940881051a9ad; 497/2021; Sanction; ; ua_nsdc_sanctions; 2024-03-06T18:31:06; 2026-03-27T08:22:02; 2026-01-06T08:22:01; 497/2021; запобігання виведенню капіталів за межі України; припинення видачі дозволів, ліцензій на ввезення в Україну з іноземної держави чи вивезення з України валютних цінностей та обмеження видачі готівки за платіжними картками, емітованими резидентами іноземної держави; позбавлення державних нагород України, інших форм відзначення; припинення дії або зупинення ліцензій та інших дозволів, одержання (наявність) яких є умовою для здійснення певного виду діяльності, зокрема, припинення дії чи зупинення дії спеціальних дозволів на користування надрами; обмеження, часткове чи повне припинення транзиту ресурсів, польотів та перевезень територією України; заборона видачі дозволів, ліцензій Національного банку України на здійснення інвестицій в іноземну державу, розміщення валютних цінностей на рахунках і вкладах на території іноземної держави; інші санкції, що відповідають принципам їх застосування, встановленим цим Законом; блокування активів - тимчасове обмеження права особи користуватися та розпоряджатися належним їй майном; зупинення виконання економічних та фінансових зобов’язань; заборона участі у приватизації, оренді державного майна резидентами іноземної держави та особами, які прямо чи опосередковано контролюються резидентами іноземної держави або діють в їх інтересах; обмеження торговельних операцій; заборона передання технологій, прав на об’єкти права інтелектуальної власності; заборона або обмеження заходження іноземних невійськових суден та військових кораблів до територіального моря України, її внутрішніх вод, портів та повітряних суден до повітряного простору України або здійснення посадки на території України; National Security and Defense Council; https://drs.nsdc.gov.ua/; https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/4972021-40237; https://drs.nsdc.gov.ua/; ua; active; 21049711100094; UA-SA1644; Безстроково; 2021-10-05; Q4412919; ; usgsa-7d0fe989645f869f8e04e73316014850dbf6fad9; Reciprocal; Sanction; ; us_sam_exclusions; 2024-06-14T06:55:20; 2026-03-27T08:51:33; 2024-06-14T06:55:20; TREAS-OFAC; Q4412919; PII data has been masked from view; S4MRJ4WXM; Reciprocal; 2021-08-20; Prohibition/Restriction; https://sam.gov/data-services/Exclusions/Public%20V2?privacy=Public; 2021-09-14; us; ; usgsa-9df5b5eddba744065024932529642cf80e18ef55; Reciprocal; Sanction; ; us_sam_exclusions; 2024-06-14T06:55:20; 2026-03-27T08:51:33; 2024-06-14T06:55:20; 2021-08-20; Reciprocal; https://sam.gov/data-services/Exclusions/Public%20V2?privacy=Public; TREAS-OFAC; 2021-09-14; Prohibition/Restriction; PII data has been masked from view; us; S4MRJ4Y1H; Q4412919; ; usgsa-dde6ca31700cdf51e829b01e61c4a9652d5806ec; Reciprocal; Sanction; ; us_sam_exclusions; 2024-06-14T06:55:20; 2026-03-27T08:51:33; 2024-06-14T06:55:20; S4MRJ4Y1J; https://sam.gov/data-services/Exclusions/Public%20V2?privacy=Public; 2021-09-14; Reciprocal; us; Q4412919; 2021-08-20; PII data has been masked from view; Prohibition/Restriction; TREAS-OFAC; ; usgsa-f9a697907a1dc6878af3c35c2982cb65ceff18c3; Reciprocal; Sanction; ; us_sam_exclusions; 2024-06-14T06:55:20; 2026-03-27T08:51:33; 2024-06-14T06:55:20; 2021-08-20; https://sam.gov/data-services/Exclusions/Public%20V2?privacy=Public; S4MRJ4Y1K; Prohibition/Restriction; PII data has been masked from view; Reciprocal; Q4412919; 2021-09-14; us; TREAS-OFAC; | | Fuente : | https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=32735; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0328 | | Educación : | Saint Petersburg State University of Aerospace Instrumentation | | Tema : | mil; poi; debarment; export.control; sanction | | Información : | gb_fcdo_sanctions; wd_curated; wikidata; us_trade_csl; ru_acf_bribetakers; us_sam_exclusions; us_ofac_sdn; ca_dfatd_sema_sanctions; tw_shtc; ua_nsdc_sanctions; ext_us_ofac_press_releases | | Persona con Información Pública : | Id Q4412919 |
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